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We conducted a systematic review of the scientific lit-
erature from 1966 to 2005 to determine whether animals
could provide early warning of a bioterrorism attack, serve
as markers for ongoing exposure risk, and amplify or prop-
agate a bioterrorism outbreak. We found evidence that, for
certain bioterrorism agents, pets, wildlife, or livestock could
provide early warning and that for other agents, humans
would likely manifest symptoms before illness could be
detected in animals. After an acute attack, active surveil-
lance of wild or domestic animal populations could help
identify many ongoing exposure risks. If certain bioterror-
ism agents found their way into animal populations, they
could spread widely through animal-to-animal transmission
and prove difficult to control. The public health infrastruc-
ture must look beyond passive surveillance of acute animal
disease events to build capacity for active surveillance and
intervention efforts to detect and control ongoing outbreaks
of disease in domestic and wild animal populations. 
M
ost priority bioterrorism agents are zoonotic in ori-
gin. As a result, an attack on human populations with
a bioterrorism agent would likely pose a health risk to ani-
mal populations in the target area; therefore, integrating
veterinary and human public health surveillance efforts is
essential. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), in planning for the early detection and manage-
ment of a biological terrorism attack, has recommended
the “prompt diagnosis of unusual or suspicious health
problems in animals,” as well as establishing “criteria for
investigating and evaluating suspicious clusters of human
and animal disease or injury and triggers for notifying law
enforcement of suspected acts of biological or chemical
terrorism” (1). Similarly, an indicator of a biological ter-
rorism attack would be “increased numbers of sick or dead
animals, often of different species. Some BW (biological
warfare) agents are capable of infecting/intoxicating a
wide range of hosts” (2). In part because of such recom-
mendations, calls have been made for enhanced veterinary
surveillance for outbreaks of animal disease caused by
bioterrorism agents and better communication between
animal health and human health professionals. For such
efforts to succeed, the relevance to human health of disease
events in animals must be established. The potential use of
animals as “sentinels” of a human bioterrorism attack can
be differentiated from the possibility of a direct attack on
animals of agricultural importance (agroterrorism) and is
the subject of this review. 
First, animals could provide an early warning to
humans if clinical signs could be detected before human
illness emerged or soon enough to allow preventive meas-
ures to be initiated. This early detection could occur
because an animal species had increased susceptibility to a
particular agent, because the disease caused by the agent
had a shorter incubation period, or because animals were
exposed sooner (or at more intense and continuous levels)
than the human population (2). The simultaneous appear-
ance of disease signs and symptoms in animals may con-
tribute to the more rapid identification of a biological
warfare agent that was producing nonspecific effects in
nearby persons. 
Second, if a released biological agent persists in the
environment (such as soil, water, or air), active surveil-
lance for sporadic illness in animals could help detect
ongoing exposure risks. Additionally, the geographic pat-
tern of sick or dead animals could indicate the persistence
of a biological threat (2). 
Finally, animal populations such as wild birds, com-
mercially shipped livestock, and animals involved in the
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maintenance and spread of an epidemic attributable to an
intentional release of a biological agent. Detecting the
agent in such mobile populations could therefore signal the
ongoing spread of the agent and provide an opportunity for
interventions to prevent further spread. 
Previous reviews have discussed the implications of
bioterrorism attacks on human and animal health (3). Yet
these reviews did not examine the strength of evidence or
attempt to determine whether animals could be effective
sentinels for particular agents. 
We therefore reviewed the biomedical literature for evi-
dence that animals could fulfill the above criteria for sen-
tinel potential. We also hypothesized that large gaps in
knowledge exist in this area, including different levels of
evidence regarding specific agents and types of animals. 
Methods
We systematically searched the biomedical literature
from 1966 to 2005 for reports of adverse health events in
animals that were attributed to potential bioterrorism
agents. The CDC publication Biological and Chemical
Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response
(1) contains a list of biological and chemical agents that
could be used in a terrorist attack. Infectious agents are
categorized as A, B, or C, depending on their risk to pub-
lic health. We searched the Medline database for reports of
animal exposure to these biological agents. As a further
check, we performed focused searches for individual
agents in the CAB Abstracts and Agricultural Online
Access (AGRICOLA) databases and also reviewed the
bibliographies of recent bioterrorism reviews to locate
additional sources.
Our search method used both the name of the agent and
the terms “animals, wild” “animals, domestic” and “ani-
mals, zoo.” For each agent, we searched for peer-reviewed
studies of infection in animal populations caused by a spe-
cific agent, as well as authoritative subject reviews. The
episodes of infection included both actual bioterrorism
events as well as naturally occurring epizootics. This
search process identified ≈6,000 potential citations,
including original journal articles, textbook chapters, and
reviews, which were manually culled for relevance to ani-
mal sentinel issues; this process resulted in ≈200 citations
available for final analysis. 
Studies that included data about relative incubation
periods and susceptibilities in animals were compared to
human data to determine whether evidence supported the
use of animals as early warning of bioterrorism agents. We
also included in this category reports of animals displaying
evidence of infection before nearby human populations
did. Data on human incubation periods and infective doses
for individual agents were obtained from standard refer-
ences on biological warfare and terrorism (4). Studies that
detected symptomatic infection or biomarkers of infection
for agents that persist in the environment were reviewed to
determine whether they supported the utility of animals for
ongoing exposure monitoring. Studies that demonstrated a
substantial degree of animal-to-animal or animal-to-
human transmission (with or without a vector) were con-
sidered to provide evidence that animals could propagate
an outbreak of infectious disease caused by a deliberately
released pathogen. 
Analysis of Evidence
Studies located in the above search were classified
according to agent, disease, species, and study method, and
these data were then entered into an online database of ani-
mals as sentinels of human environmental health hazards
(available from http://canarydatabase.org/) for further
analysis. For the purposes of this review, we created a tax-
onomy for evidence regarding animals of sentinels based
on existing evidence-based medicine taxonomies that pro-
vide guidelines for assigning levels of evidence based on
quality and consistency of scientific studies (5). We con-
sidered level 1 evidence studies to include experimental
studies, cohort studies, and systematic reviews of high-
quality studies with consistent findings. We classified
case-control studies and cross-sectional surveys of animals
as level 2 evidence. Evidence from professional consensus
statements, textbooks, and descriptive case reports was
classified as level 3 evidence. To arrive at an overall
strength of recommendation based on a body of evidence,
we used these levels of evidence to determine the overall
strength of the recommendation that animals could serve in
the 3 sentinel capacities of early warning signal, ongoing
exposure indicator, and potential propagator and spreader
of a bioterrorism agent.
Results
The Table displays the evidence found for animals serv-
ing in a sentinel capacity for specific agents or classes of
agents. 
Evidence That Animals Provide Early 
Warning of an Acute Bioterrorism Attack 
For a number of agents, this review found evidence that
animals might be affected before human populations. For
Bacillus anthracis, whether animals would have a shorter
incubation period in the event of an aerosol release was not
clear, since the incubation period in the 2001 mail attacks
was <4 days, while during the 1979 release of B. anthracis
from a Soviet military laboratory, human symptoms began
in 2 days, with death in as few as 6 days (6). At the same
time, while human cases in Sverdlovsk were concentrated
along the path of the prevailing wind <4 km from the lab-
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3 days after the release in 6 villages located along the path
of the aerosol at a distance <50 km downwind from the
facility. No human cases were reported in these villages.
Calculations of the airborne B. anthracis dosage at a town
where several sheep and a cow died indicate that the ani-
mals were exposed to a dose more than an order of magni-
tude lower than humans received near the weapons facility.
This finding suggests that sheep and cows are more sus-
ceptible than humans, although they could have also
remained outside in the path of the aerosol for a longer
period, which led to greater exposure (6). 
For Yersinia pestis, evidence from experimental inhala-
tion studies in cats indicates that the usual incubation peri-
od for symptoms of plague to develop after an inhalation
exposure may be shorter (1–2 days) than the presumed
incubation time for humans (1–6 days), which provides
evidence that symptoms develop in cats at the same time
as in humans, and thus may have some sentinel value. In
contrast to the findings for anthrax and plague, however,
we were unable to find evidence that animals could pro-
vide early warning of infection with airborne Francisella
tularensis. During a prolonged outbreak of pneumonic
tularemia in Scandinavia, for example, febrile illness
developed in a number of horses, a cow, and a pig, but
apparently not before the onset of disease in humans living
nearby (13).
For foodborne illnesses, including botulism, animals
would likely not manifest illness before humans if an
attack were directed at humans, since in a typical attack
scenario, food would be infected during the distribution
pathway before consumption by humans and not necessar-
ily allow for animal consumption before this. We did not
locate reports of animals becoming symptomatic with
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However, if the attack on the food supply were directed at
the animals themselves, they could potentially manifest
symptoms before humans who would consume the meat,
eggs, or dairy products (24). Attacks on water supplies
with agents such as Clostridium botulinum could put
humans at risk as well, although dilution and water treat-
ment would reduce the risk (37). An exception may be
Cryptosporidium spp., which have caused widespread out-
breaks through the water supply. Waterfowl die-offs from
type C and type E botulism have been well documented,
although these types are not well recognized as causes of
clinical C. botulinum poisoning in humans, but the fact that
primates are susceptible to type C makes C. botulinum poi-
soning a possibility. On the whole, however, an attack on
human populations with C. botulinum would probably not
be first detected in animals; the illness would have such a
short incubation period in humans that they would become
symptomatic at the same time as or before the animals. 
For alphaviruses, natural outbreaks have often appeared
in animal populations before they affected humans, for
example, eastern equine encephalitis virus often appears in
equines 2 weeks before humans become symptomatic (28).
Whether the same pattern would hold true during an attack
with an aerosol is not clear. For certain newer agents, such
as filoviruses and Nipah virus, current evidence is insuffi-
cient to state whether after a generalized release of an
aerosolized agent, animal infection would precede that in
humans. Studies in Africa have demonstrated that Ebola
virus outbreaks can be preceded by deaths in primates as
well as in other animal species such as duikers (type of
antelope) (17), but whether a generalized attack that used
Ebola virus in the United States would affect certain ani-
mal species first is unknown. 
For a number of agents, including Brucella  spp.,
Coxiella burnetii, and hantavirus, infection in animals is
either asymptomatic or develops so slowly that recogniza-
ble human cases seem certain to precede animal cases if
the agents are released as an aerosol. Finally, the illnesses
caused by some agents appear to have shorter incubation
times in animals, for example, the 12-hour incubation peri-
od for Rift Valley fever in calves and lambs (23) compared
to the incubation period of several days in humans.
Evidence That Animals Could Be 
Markers for Ongoing Exposure Risk
After the acute release of a bioterrorist agent, public
health officials could be faced with the possibility of an
agent persisting in the environment. Anthrax spores can
survive for years in soil. Therefore, monitoring for spo-
radic cases in animal populations such as livestock could
indicate so-called exposure hot spots. Although dogs and
cats are less susceptible to B. anthracis than ruminants,
their proximity to humans and their contact with soil could
make them sentinels; for example, anthrax developed in a
Labrador retriever after the dog hunted in a freshly plowed
field (8). In the case of ongoing exposures to an agent that
has become established in an animal population, case
detection could be useful; this situation has been seen for
plague in cats (9). Similarly, agents like Brucella spp. and
C. burnetii, although they do not cause severe acute illness
in animals, could be detected by recognizing increased
rates of abortion among a variety of species. 
Aside from case detection, active surveillance with sur-
veys of animals may be useful; this surveillance may
require testing wildlife as well. Such testing could involve
antibody seroprevalence or use of polymerase chain reac-
tion techniques to detect antigen. Evidence about the use-
fulness of such an approach was inconsistent. During an
epidemic of pneumonic tularemia, attributable to contami-
nated hay, the etiologic agent, F. tularensis, can persist in
the environment; a serosurvey of asymptomatic livestock
(horses and cows) did not show evidence of exposure (13).
By contrast, in a more recent tularemia outbreak, serosur-
veys in the wildlife population did show antibodies in a
skunk and a rat that lived near persons who had become
infected after mowing fields (14). 
Evidence That Animals Could Propagate 
an Epidemic Caused by a Bioterrorism Agent 
A number of biological terrorism agents have little
potential for secondary spread in either animal or human
populations, including B. anthracis and C. botulinum. For
other agents, however, we found evidence that their intro-
duction into an animal population could cause an epizoot-
ic that would then place additional human populations at
risk. For example, studies of mosquitoes native to the
United States have demonstrated their potential to spread a
disease such as Rift Valley fever through livestock and
other animal populations (29), even though person-to-per-
son transmission does not occur. The results of animal sur-
veillance for Ebola virus in Africa found that ongoing
outbreaks in both primates and duikers suggest that the
virus may be able to propagate in a wildlife population
(17), however, this characteristic has not been demonstrat-
ed in US wildlife species. 
Agents such as C. burnetii and Brucella spp. spread
easily in animal populations through direct contact and can
then pose a wider risk to humans, even though human-to-
human transmission does not occur. Agents such as
alphaviruses that are prevalent in wild bird populations can
spread over a wide area in a short time (27). Experimental
studies have documented that viruses such as West Nile
virus can easily spread from animal to animal in bird pop-
ulations (36). 
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For a number of biological terrorism agents, we found
evidence that animals could provide early warning of an
acute attack. For the agents for which we found evidence
of sentinel potential, a key factor was the relative exposure
risk of an animal compared to that of a nearby human pop-
ulation. However, in an actual event involving both
humans and animals, the fact that disease was detected
sooner in animals could be due to an interplay of a number
of factors, including local infrastructure of animal and
human health services, public awareness, and laboratory
capacity. For other agents, however, humans would
demonstrate symptoms at the same time as nearby animals
or before. Therefore, the strength of evidence regarding
animals serving as early indicators of an attack depends
strongly on the agent and species involved. For some
agents for which animals would not provide early warning,
however, animals could help detect pockets of ongoing
exposure risk. For the remainder of agents, evidence
regarding the value of animals as sentinels is insufficient at
this time.
Overall, according to our classification taxonomy, the
strength of the recommendation that animals could provide
early warning of an acute bioterrorism attack seems to be,
at best, “fair” because of the inconsistency of the evidence.
Asomewhat more consistent level of evidence appeared to
support the recommendation that animals could be mark-
ers for ongoing exposure risk and also that animals could
play a strong role in propagating outbreaks caused by par-
ticular agents. At the same time, our ability to assess the
overall strength of evidence for such recommendations
was hampered by large gaps in current knowledge. 
These findings suggest the need for certain steps relat-
ed to preparedness for biological agent attacks. First,
improved communication is needed between animal health
and human health professionals, so that sentinel events
could be rapidly detected. Such improvement would mean
overcoming existing barriers to communication; a recent
survey found that physicians and veterinarians communi-
cate little about zoonotic issues (38). Also, an adequate
surveillance network should be developed to detect unusu-
al health events in animal populations. Data on usual
trends is missing for most animal species that could be
potential sentinels. Whether public health resources can be
committed to gathering such baseline data remains an open
question. 
Second, the results of this review indicate that active
surveillance of animal populations, including wildlife and
companion animals, could fill a critical need in the after-
math of an attack involving certain bioterrorism agents by
helping identify persistent sources of infection in the envi-
ronment. Third, better approaches for intervention are
needed to be able to stem the propagation and amplifica-
tion of an introduced biological warfare agent into a wild
or domestic animal population. The US experience with
West Nile virus reflects the difficulties of controlling an
emerging zoonotic threat as it spreads through animal pop-
ulations (39). 
Finally, the results of this review point out the need for
additional research to fill knowledge gaps about animals as
sentinels of human disease threats, including data on rela-
tive susceptibilities and exposure pathways for animal
species living near human populations. Concrete steps
could include establishment of surveillance veterinary
clinics in strategic areas with incentives for practitioners to
report unusual events. Another approach would be to make
greater use of electronic databases of animal diseases such
as those used by the Banfield Clinics, a nationwide chain
of veterinary practices. Similar efforts could be useful with
wildlife populations. 
Such steps would foster ongoing communication
between community practitioners and regional public and
private veterinary diagnostic laboratories to establish base-
line disease incidence trends and algorithms to identify
outbreaks. Common links or web-based interfaces should
be developed to integrate human and animal disease sur-
veillance information. Reporting systems for wildlife pro-
fessionals and the public should be created, and their use
should be encouraged to document unusual disease events
and die-offs. Another constructive step would be to
improve the capacity of existing veterinary rapid-response
teams, which exist in many states, to carry out active sur-
veillance with animal populations as well as to improve the
coordination of veterinary diagnostic laboratories. Again,
barriers to funding and cooperation between animal and
human health agencies need to be addressed. In the past,
these have hampered efforts to have a coordinated
approach to collection of animal surveillance data). In
addition, state-based efforts would need to be coordinated
on a regional and national scale. The growing awareness
that animal health and human health are inextricably
linked, however, makes cooperation between human and
animal health professionals imperative to strengthen the
evidence base that will allow for rational use of animal
data in public health decision-making. 
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